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The Judicial Campaign against Polygamy 
and the Enduring Legal Questions
Edwin B. Firmage
For lay people the chief virtue of our Constitution is not in its 
distribution of power or in its guarantees of participation in govern­
mental processes but in the protections it affords individual liberties, 
not least of which is freedom of conscience. Yet ratification of the Bill 
of Rights did not fix in stone the content of constitutional guarantees. 
Instead, it was left to the judiciary to interpret the simple phrases of the 
first eight amendments in concrete cases, illuminated by evidence of the 
framers' intent and changing social values. Perhaps no provision of the 
Bill of Rights better exemplifies this process of judicial interpretation 
than the First Amendment’s free exercise clause.
Unfortunately for nineteenth-century Mormons, the seminal case 
interpreting the free exercise clause— Reynolds vs. United States— came 
early in the process. Reynolds upheld antipolygamy legislation against 
the Mormons’ free exercise claims, effectively ending the Mormons’ 
efforts to obey both the laws of God and the laws of man and stunting the 
growth of free exercise protections for generations. In the years since 
Reynolds, the Supreme Court has gradually evolved a more civil- 
libertarian view of the free exercise clause, balancing free exercise 
claims against the government’s interest in regulating the particular 
conduct in question. But it has never completely abandoned Reynolds or 
its rationale, and in its most recent decisions the Court has shown signs 
that it may be retreating to an earlier, more restrictive view of First 
Amendment protections.
EARLY JUDICIAL ATTACKS ON POLYGAMY
Officially acknowledged as part of LDS church doctrine in 1852, 
Polygamy soon became a national issue. But weak laws, tenuous federal 
^ntrol in Utah Territory, and national distraction with other issues
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prevented effective enforcement of the antipolygamy laws until the 
1880s. Congress’s first attempt to deal with polygamy was the Morrill 
Act.1 It was not passed until 1862, ten years after the Church first 
announced its practice of polygamy, and then went largely unenforced 
for the next thirteen years. At least four reasons explain why the 
Mormons were left in relative peace for so long. First, when polygamy 
became an issue, the nation’s energies were distracted by more pressing 
problems— the Civil War and Reconstruction. The fight for national 
survival forced the Mormon problem to wait.2 Second, the handful of 
federal officials in Utah during the 1860s did not believe they possessed 
the means to enforce compliance with the unpopular polygamy act. This 
attitude was not unfounded. In 1863 the mere rumor that Brigham Young 
was about to be arrested for polygamy provoked two thousand armed 
Mormons to assemble at his home to resist the arrest.3 Third, the feeble 
federal control over Utah’s population was matched by nearly as feeble 
control over the territorial government. The governor and supreme court 
justices were appointed by the President, but the territorial legislature 
and the bulk of the judiciary lay in Mormon hands. The legislature 
expanded the powers of the judiciary by giving Utah’s probate courts 
general jurisdiction over all civil and criminal cases, allowing probate 
judges to draw up jury lists, and establishing a territorial marshal and 
attorney with powers paralleling those of their federal counterparts.4 
This rival Mormon-controlled judicial system, with powers concurrent 
with the federal judiciary, tended to frustrate enforcement of the 
antipolygamy laws. Finally, the prosecution of polygamy was delayed 
by defects in the statute itself. Polygamy under the Morrill Act was 
subject to a three-year statute of limitations, so polygamists who eluded 
prosecution for three years were free from peril. Furthermore, the Morrill 
Act required proof of multiple marriages, creating almost insuperable 
evidentiary problems.5
Because of these problems, the first attempts to prosecute polyga­
mists were not brought under the Morrill Act at all. In 1871 one Thomas 
Hawkins was indicted for and convicted of having adulterous relations 
with his polygamous wife.6 Indictments immediately followed against a 
number of leading Church officials (including Brigham Young) under a 
Utah statute prohibiting lewd and lascivious cohabitation.7 By indicting 
the Church’s leading figures, the government sought to set a vivid 
example for rank and file members, paralyze the Church’s leadership, 
and cow the Mormon populace into submission to federal policy. During 
the proceedings against Brigham Young, Judge McKean, a rabid anti' 
Mormon, declared:
While the case at the bar is called ‘The People versus Brigham Young, its
other and real title is Federal Authority versus Polygamic Theocracy.’ • ■ ■
The one government arrests the other in the person of its chief, and arraigns
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it at the bar. A system is on trial in the person o f Brigham Young. Let all 
concerned keep this fact steadily in view; and let that government rule 
without a rival which shall prove to be in the right.8
Young’s trial was thus meant to crush at one blow the practice of 
polygamy and the power of the church that rivaled federal authority. 
McKean’s plan was not to be realized, however. In Clinton vs. 
Englebrecht, the United States Supreme Court ruled that in his efforts to 
purge juries of Mormons and secure the conviction of polygamists Judge 
McKean had improperly ignored Utah’s jury selection procedures.9 As 
a result of the decision in Englebrecht, Hawkins’s conviction for adultery 
was overturned, and the indictments against Young and the others were 
dismissed.10 The prosecution of polygamy was thus halted until 1875 and 
the Reynolds case. Even after the Reynolds decision upheld the Morrill 
Act, that statute remained “constitutionally pure, but practically worth­
less,” and only two Morrill Act cases ever reached the Supreme Court.11
THE REYNOLDS DECISION
George Reynolds was an English immigrant, private secretary to 
Brigham Young, and a polygamist.12 In October 1874 he was indicted 
under the Morrill Act.13 Church historians maintain that Reynolds began 
as a test case designed to determine the constitutionality of the anti­
polygamy statute and that Reynolds volunteered to test the statute and 
cooperate in his prosecution in return for the government’s agreement 
not to seek a harsh punishment in his case.14 Non-Mormon historians 
assert that no deal was ever struck.15 Reynolds was duly convicted of 
polygamy on the testimony of his polygamous wife, but the case swiftly 
became caught up in the sort of procedural pitfalls that had become 
commonplace in Utah’s judicial system. On appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court, Reynolds argued that the grand jury that had indicted him had 
been improperly constituted.16 The jury had been selected in accordance 
with the newly enacted Poland Act, which had limited the power of the 
Mormon-controlled probate courts by changing the procedures for 
selecting juries but which had not changed the number of jurors 
required.17 The trial court empaneled twenty-three grand jurors in accor­
dance with federal practice. Utah law provided that a grand jury was to 
be composed of fifteen jurors. The Utah Supreme Court reversed 
Reynolds’s conviction because the trial court had followed federal rather 
than territorial law in fixing the size of the grand jury.
In October 1875 Reynolds was again indicted for violating the 
Morrill Act. This time, in accordance with Utah law, the indictment was 
handed down by a grand jury of fifteen men, seven Mormons and eight 
n°n-Mormons.18 However, Reynolds declined to cooperate with his own 
Prosecution, and his polygamous wife could not be found to testify
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against him. The polygamous wife not being available, the trial court 
admitted her testimony from the previous trial into evidence.19 Again, 
Reynolds was convicted and sentenced to two years’ hard labor and a five 
hundred dollar fine. The Utah Supreme Court sustained his conviction.20
This time Reynolds argued that the trial court should have followed 
federal law in setting the size of the grand jury since he had been indicted 
under a federal statute. The Utah Supreme Court had little patience for 
this change of tack and easily rejected the argument. Reynolds next 
argued that potential jurors had been questioned improperly about their 
personal attitudes toward polygamy. But the court held that persons who 
believed in or practiced polygamy could not be impartial jurors and thus 
could properly be excluded. (The court ruled that prospective jurors’ 
invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
was equivalent to an admission of guilt and eviscerated that 
amendment’s protection.) The admission of the testimony of Reynolds’s 
polygamous wife at the first trial was likewise deemed proper.21 Finally, 
the trial court’s instruction to the jury that it “should consider what are 
to be the consequences to the innocent victims of this delusion” was held 
not to be prejudicial.22 The court likened the instruction to a mere 
admonition that jurors should heed the law.
With but one avenue of appeal remaining, Reynolds turned to the 
United States Supreme Court.23 The Supreme Court affirmed the terri­
torial court’s rejection of Reynolds’s challenges to the grand jury’s size, 
improprieties injury selection, admission of his polygamous w ife’s prior 
testimony, and prejudicial jury instruction. But the bulk of the Court’s 
opinion was devoted to Reynolds’s claim that the trial court improperly 
failed to instruct the jury that a finding that Reynolds engaged in 
polygamy as a result of a sincere religious conviction would justify his 
acquittal. Reynolds argued that the First Amendment’s guarantee of the 
freedom of religion can excuse conduct that would otherwise be crimi­
nal. The Court’s analysis of that issue made Reynolds a landmark case.
The Court first attempted to decide what sense of the word religion 
fell within the ambit of the constitutional provision that “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof.” Finding no guide to the definition of the term 
religion in the Constitution itself, the Court turned to the writings of 
Madison and Jefferson, sources contemporary with the adoption of the 
First Amendment. The Court quoted from Jefferson to the effect that 
“religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his G od;. . .  the 
legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not 
opinions.”24 Adopting this demarcation, the Court concluded that 
“Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but 
was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or 
subversive of good order.”25 " <
Campaign against Polygamy 95
In arriving at the conclusion that “laws are made for the 
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere 
religious belief and opinions, they may with practices/’26 the Court 
grasped one-half of a profound dilemma posed by the First 
Amendment’s protection of religion. The Court recognized that the 
First Amendment could not be read so broadly that any conduct asserted 
to be an exercise of religion would be immune from state regulation.27 
But the Court wrongly concluded that, because not all religious conduct 
could reasonably be exempted from civil control, no religious conduct 
was protected by the First Amendment. By so concluding, the Court 
ignored the express terms of the Constitution, which protect the 
“free exercise” of religion.28 Moreover, the Court overlooked the other 
side of the First Amendment dilemma. Religion is as much conduct as it 
is belief. The two cannot be disentangled. It is with regard to those 
religious practices offensive to the majority of a community that the 
issue of freedom of religion arises. In a democracy, laws are most certain 
to accord with the values of the majority’s religion. It is the religious 
practice of unpopular minorities that are most likely to be restricted by 
the state and are thus most in need of protection. The free speech clause 
of the First Amendment fully protects freedom of belief. Thus, unless 
the free exercise clause protects at least some practices that are offensive 
to the majority, that provision is devoid of any practical content. Yet the 
Reynolds decision forecloses such an application of the First 
Amendment.
Having established the belief-conduct distinction and determined 
that the First Amendment was no bar to outlawing religiously inspired 
conduct, the Court next concluded that polygamy was sufficiently 
“subversive of good order” as to be properly made a crime. This second 
conclusion is also troublesome. As Linford notes, “the Court never 
quite explained why plural marriage was a threat to the public well­
being.”29 Laurence Tribe suggests that Reynolds was wrongly decided 
because the Court overrode core personal rights of privacy and 
religious expression for the sake of diffuse social goals.30 No victims of 
Reynolds’s conduct were produced, it was conceded that polygamous 
sects might be well-ordered, and the Court never examined whether 
polygamy degraded women. Instead, the Court found subversion of the 
social order on the basis of an abstract syllogism that polygamy meant 
patriarchy, which meant despotism. To avoid this amorphous social evil, 
the Court invaded the right to religious freedom and limited the right to 
marry, a core element of personhood. In Tribe’s words, “Few decisions 
better illustrate how amorphous goals may serve to mask religious 
Persecution.”31 Nevertheless, Reynolds’s conviction was unanimously 
affirmed.32
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THE PROSECUTION OF COHABITATION  
UNDER THE EDM UNDS ACT
Although the Reynolds decision was a saddening blow to the 
Mormons, the immediate impact of the decision was limited. 
Reynolds established that Congress had the power to punish polygamy, 
but the Morrill Act was a cumbersome weapon with which to do so. 
However, the period in which the Mormons would effectively resist 
Washington’s mandate was rapidly ending. By 1880, the tone of 
congressional debate indicated that the government not only had the 
power to outlaw polygamy but also had the will to act. The Mormons 
could no longer depend on isolation to ensure their neglect by 
Washington. Mining, commerce, migration, and the transcontinental 
railroad all brought the nation to Utah. While Utah was far enough 
from the seat of government that Congress’s knowledge of Mormon 
society was mostly second-hand, garbled, and derived from biased 
sources, it was near enough to be a constant and growing irritation to a 
nation that was rapidly spanning the continent and that was now largely 
undistracted by more serious problems. In a sorry cycle, Congress began 
considering a series of more severe anti-Mormon bills, in reaction not so 
much to the offense of polygamy as to prior Mormon resistance. Because 
polygamy was supported by the Mormon church, attempts to stamp out 
polygamy became attacks on the institution of the Church and Mormons 
in general.
In 1882 Congress adopted the Edmunds Act, which gave federal 
officials an efficient weapon for the prosecution of polygamists.33 
It created the new offense of unlawful cohabitation (relieving 
prosecutors of the burden of proving polygamous marriages), allowed 
joinder of polygamy and cohabitation charges, and effectively 
eliminated all Mormons as jurors in polygamy cases. The new law 
proved an effective tool in the hands of the Church’s opponents. 
Convictions of polygamists went from one in 1875 to 220 in 1887.34 By 
1893, after the Church had renounced polygamy and prosecutions 
largely ceased, there had been 1,004 convictions for unlawful 
cohabitation and thirty-one for polygamy.35 The mere number of 
polygamy and cohabitation convictions, however, understates the 
impact of “the raid” on Mormon society. Not just any Mormon male 
was allowed to practice polygamy; only those who were morally 
worthy and financially able were permitted to take plural wives. Thus, by 
and large, the polygamists were also the Mormons’ leaders.36 rhe 
conviction and imprisonment of polygamists served, then, to paralyze 
Mormon society by removing its leadership. Moreover, many 
polygamists who were not convicted were forced to go into hiding or flee 
the United States.
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The Offense Broadened
To simplify polygamy prosecution, the Edmunds Act provided 
that men who “cohabit with more than one woman” would be guilty of 
a misdemeanor.37 The act, however, did not say what conduct constituted 
cohabitation, nor does the Congressional Record offer any evidence that 
Congress considered the question. The Mormons argued that the bench­
mark of “cohabitation” should be sexual intercourse. But such a defini­
tion of “cohabit” would have been undesirable in at least two respects. 
First, proving sexual intercourse would be difficult. If the Morrill Act had 
proven ineffective because of the difficulties entailed in proving the 
fact of marriage, the Edmunds Act would be even more useless if proof 
of cohabitation required proof of intercourse. Second, to require 
Mormons to parade the details of their most intimate family life before 
the courts would be an unendurable invasion of privacy. But to accept 
less intimate evidence as establishing “cohabitation” could remove all 
standards for the determination of guilt.
The courts first confronted the issue of what constituted cohabita­
tion in United States vs. Cannon,38 Angus Cannon, president o f the 
Salt Lake Stake, had married three wives prior to passage of the 
Edmunds Act.39 Two of these wives, Clara and Amanda, lived with him 
in separate quarters in the same home. The third lived in a house nearby.40 
Cannon was indicted for cohabiting with Amanda and Clara after 
passage of the Edmunds Act. At trial, Cannon offered to prove that, after 
Congress had passed the.Edmunds Act, he had told Clara, Amanda, and 
their families that he did not intend to violate the law and thereafter “did 
not occupy the rooms or bed of or have any sexual intercourse with” Clara 
but could not afford to provide a separate house for Clara and her family. 
The court excluded the evidence as irrelevant, and Cannon was 
convicted. Adhering to the Church’s direction to fight polygamy 
prosecutions to the utmost, Cannon appealed to the Utah Supreme 
Court.41 His main objections were that “all cohabitation which the law 
deals with is sexual cohabitation,” of which he was innocent, and that his 
proffered evidence was wrongly excluded. The court, however, rejected 
this interpretation of the Edmunds Act. It concluded that Congress’s 
intent was to eliminate problems attending proof of polygamous mar­
riages and that “the pretense of marriage— the living, to all intents and 
purposes, so far as the public could see, as husband and wife— a holding 
°ut of that relationship to the world, were the evils sought to be 
eradicated.”42 Proof of sexual intercourse was not necessary to make 
out such an offense because the aim of the act was not “to punish 
mere sexual crimes.”43 Indeed, the court reasoned that to construe the 
statute as Cannon urged would render the cohabitation offense 
superfluous since other statutes already covered sexual offenses. The
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court concluded that “cohabitation” meant dwelling together and not 
sexual intercourse.44 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the 
decision.45 Adopting much of the reasoning of the Utah court, the 
Supreme Court concluded that cohabitation was established if Cannon 
“held [the two women] out to the world, by his language or conduct, or 
both, as his w ives.” Cannon’s agreement to abstain from sexual relations 
with his plural wives was dismissed with the comment that “compacts for 
sexual non-intercourse, easily made and as easily broken, when the prior 
marriage relations continue to e x is t . . . [are] not a lawful substitute for 
the monogamous family which alone the statute tolerates.”46
On the whole, the judicial refusal to make sexual intercourse the 
test for cohabitation was sensible. It is now an axiomatic standard for the 
irreducible minimum of personal privacy that government has no 
power to place spies in the bedroom.47 By construing the Edmunds Act 
to avoid that nightmare, the judiciary at least spared the Mormons an 
intolerable indignity and assault on their rights.48 The consequence, 
however, was that proving cohabitation became ridiculously easy for 
federal prosecutors. As one scholar concluded, “To be tried was, in 
effect, to be convicted.”49
The law’s directive to Mormon men to cease cohabitation meant, 
then, that they must abandon their plural wives. Wives who had been 
married decades before and who were now aged and infirm were to be 
abandoned.50 Younger wives were often to be left to support and raise 
large families alone. Thus, the moral posture of courts enforcing the 
Edmunds Act was dramatically altered. No longer did courts command 
Mormons to abandon a life of presumed debauchery, since the sexual 
activities of polygamists were legally irrelevant. Instead, in the name of 
amorphous social policies, the Mormons were called on to ignore the 
moral obligations to support aging wives and raise innocent children.
The judicial interpretation of the Edmunds Act simply failed to 
provide the Mormons with any guidance as to how far obligations toward 
plural wives and children could be honored without violating the 
Edmunds Act.51 Polygamous Mormons were thus presented with a 
difficult decision: morally they were obligated to associate with their 
polygamous families to the extent necessary to provide for their welfare, 
but because the boundaries of legally permissible conduct had been left 
undefined any contact potentially left polygamists open to prosecution. 
The facts of Cannon indicate that Cannon had genuinely attempted to 
comply with the law. Yet after the court decisions, it remained unclear 
what he might have done differently to have avoided violating the law. 
It is a constitutional maxim that the terms of the law must be sufficiently 
clear that citizens may order their conduct in conformity with it.52 As 
construed by the courts, the offense of cohabitation was not so much one 
of conduct as of appearance. Of course, the Mormons could not comply
with a statute that made their conduct largely irrelevant and considered 
only what they appeared to be, or were reputed to be, doing. To make 
matters worse, under subsequent decisions Mormons could not even 
avoid prosecution by keeping the connections with their plural families 
discrete. A polygamist was required to “separate himself entirely from 
his polygamous women.”53
As the pace of polygamy prosecutions accelerated, the thought 
occurred to some eager prosecutor that the cohabitation statute would be 
more fearsome if every defendant faced not one cohabitation charge but 
many. Such would be the case if each year, month, or day that a man 
cohabited illegally could be the basis of a separate offense. Periods of 
cohabitation could thus be divided into units as small as the prosecutor 
wished, allowing him to tailor the potential punishment to be meted out 
to individual defendants solely at his discretion.
A judicial test of this theory was attempted in the case of Lorenzo 
Snow. Snow was charged with cohabitation in three separate indict­
ments, each one charging the same offense with the same women, only 
for different years. In separate trials, Snow was convicted on each 
indictment and given the maximum sentence for each conviction. Thus, 
by segregating the charges against Snow, the prosecution was able to 
triple his punishment. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the convic­
tions.54 The only justification it advanced for allowing the prosecution to 
segregate offenses according to time was a single Massachusetts case, 
Commonwealth vs. Connors, which held that the maintenance of a 
tenement for the sale of illegal liquor could be the basis for separate 
convictions based on different periods of time.55 The United States 
Supreme Court dismissed Snow’s appeal on the ground that it did not 
have jurisdiction to hear it, since Snow did not question the validity of the 
statute but only its application.56 The Utah Supreme Court’s decision 
dramatically raised the stakes in polygamy prosecutions by making the 
penalty for cohabitation convictions far more severe. Moreover, no one 
knew how far the principle would be extended. Since the basis for 
segregation was arbitrary, in theory unlimited segregation was possible. 
With sufficient segregation, cohabitation could become punishable by 
lifetime imprisonment.
With the principle of segregation having been approved by the Utah 
Supreme Court and the possibility of further review seemingly precluded 
by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Snow, federal prose­
cutors swiftly began expanding their use of the segregation of offenses, 
testing how far the principle could be pushed. In United States vs. 
Groesbeck, the prosecution cut in half the period of each offense, 
charging the defendant with two counts of cohabitation, one for each of 
two six-month periods. Unlike thtSnow  case, the trial of the two charges 
Was consolidated. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court sustained both
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these innovations.57 The court dismissed the argument that a single trial 
of the defendant on both charges allowed the jury improperly to consider 
Groesbeck’s first conviction in determining his guilt on the second 
charge. The court noted that consolidation of offenses into a single trial 
saved the state the burden and expenses, and the defendant the harass­
ment, of multiple litigation. In justifying the segregation of offenses, the 
court reasoned that to allow Groesbeck to be charged with only one count 
of cohabitation for his period of continuous cohabitation would be unfair. 
Such a rule could allow more serious offenders to be treated more 
leniently than lesser offenders. For example, a polygamist who ceased 
cohabiting with his wives a year after the Edmunds Act was adopted but 
renewed cohabitation after a year would be liable for two charges of 
cohabitation, whereas someone who cohabited with his wives through­
out the same period would face only one charge. Similarly, a rule that 
allowed only one charge of cohabitation to be raised, however long the 
period of cohabitation had been, provided polygamists with no incentive 
to conform to the law, for an individual’s liability was not increased by 
his continuing to cohabit nor limited by his ceasing to do so.
The court’s reasoning is flawed at several points. First, under the 
segregation rule there was no necessary relation between the length of an 
offender’s offense and the number of charges raised against him. 
Because the basis of segregation was inherently arbitrary, any offense, 
no matter how long or short its duration, could be divided into as many 
separate offenses as was desired. Snow, for example, had engaged in 
polygamy for a period of forty years and was charged with three offenses. 
Groesbeck, on the other hand, was assigned two-thirds the punishment 
given Snow, for a period of cohabitation of one year. Conversely, if 
cohabitation were treated as a continuous offense, under the principles 
governing the treatment of continuous offenses, lapses in cohabitation 
would not necessarily require separate offenses.
Meanwhile, Lorenzo Snow had served his first six-month sentence. 
He then applied to the United States Supreme Court for a writ of habeas 
corpus, claiming that his further detention was unlawful since the two 
remaining sentences were the result of an unlawful segregation of a 
single offense. As before, the government contended that the Court 
lacked jurisdiction, but this time the Court held that it had jurisdiction:
Not only had the court which tried [Snow] no jurisdiction to inflict a 
punishment in respect o f more than one o f the convictions, but, as the want 
of jurisdiction appears on the face o f the judgment, .the objection may be 
taken on habeas corpus, when the sentence on more than one o f the 
convictions is sought to be enforced.58
The Court’s opinion constituted a mild but clear rebuke to Utah s 
judicial officers for attempting to impose so patently offensive a device
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as the segregation of offenses. Cohabitation was, the Court stated, 
“inherently, a continuous offence, having duration; and not an offence 
consisting of an isolated act.”59 Indeed, as the courts had defined 
cohabitation, it was an offense o f reputation and appearance that made 
the identification o f individual acts of cohabiting all but impossible. Any 
division of the offense into separate charges must be “wholly arbitrary,” 
leaving open to as many or as few divisions as the prosecution chose to 
make. It is to prevent such arbitrary conduct that the law provides that 
inherently continuous offenses can be committed only once before 
prosecution. In short, the Court swiftly demolished the legal reasoning 
of the Utah Supreme Court in adopting the segregation principle.
Utah courts grudgingly bowed to the Supreme Court’s decision 
but implied that cohabitation offenses might still be divided where there 
had been some breaks in the periods of cohabitation or where an accused 
had more than two wives.60
Even after In re Snow, courts could still impose multiple 
punishments for what was in reality but one offense. The Edmunds 
Act specifically allowed polygamy and cohabitation charges to be 
combined.61 Because the definitions of the offenses were different, a 
man could be convicted of marrying a polygamous wife and then 
convicted again for living with her.62 The Supreme Court set limits on 
the combination of different offenses in Hans Nielsen.63 Nielsen was 
indicted for adultery and cohabitation. Both charges were directed at his 
conduct with his polygamous wife, Caroline. Nielsen pleaded guilty to 
the charge of cohabitation and was sentenced to three months imprison­
ment. When arraigned on the adultery charge, Nielsen claimed his 
conviction for cohabitation barred his further prosecution. After serving 
his sentence for cohabitation, Nielsen was tried and convicted for 
adultery and sentenced to an additional 125 days’ imprisonment. The 
United States Supreme Court granted Nielsen’s petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus.
In real terms, N ielsen’s convictions for both cohabitation and 
adultery were manifestly improper, for he was being punished for but one 
offense— having a polygamous wife. Legally, though, the elements of 
the offenses differed, so convictions for both offenses on the basis of the 
same activity appeared permissible. The Court managed to arrive at a 
sensible result. It reasoned that proof that Nielsen and Caroline lived 
together as husband and wife carried with it the assumption of inter­
course that was the essential element of the adultery charge. Thus, when 
Nielsen was convicted of cohabitation, he was convicted of all the 
dements of adultery and could not be separately punished for that 
offense. With Hans Nielsen, attempts to make the polygamy laws more 
savage by piling offenses together or fractioning a single act into many 
Separate offenses ceased.
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The Edmunds Act prosecutions saw a distortion of the rules of 
evidence, in part due to the same vindictive spirit that animated the harsh 
application of the polygamy laws, but in part the result of that same 
vagueness and emphasis on appearance that afflicted the substantive 
provisions of the Edmunds Act. Since the offense of cohabitation 
consisted of appearing to consort with two or more women, proof that the 
accused had married either or both women was not necessary. On the 
other hand, so long as a man cohabited with only one woman, he would 
seem to be in compliance with the law, regardless of whether that woman 
was the man’s lawful wife. Thus, a polygamist seemingly could abandon 
his legally recognized wife, live exclusively with a later plural wife, and 
not be guilty of cohabitation. However, a construction of the Edmunds 
Act that allowed a polygamist to retain whichever one of his wives he 
wished so long as he retained only one was, of course, not well received 
by the courts.64 The judicial solution to this problem was a presumption, 
first announced in United States vs. Snow, that a man cohabited with his 
legal w ife.65
To comply with the law, Lorenzo Snow had set each of his older 
wives up in a separate household and refrained from almost all contact 
with them. He lived solely with his last wife, who still had infant children 
to raise. Nevertheless, he was convicted of cohabitation. The Utah 
Supreme Court upheld the conviction, not because he was cohabiting 
with more than one wife, but because he was with the wrong wife. The 
court reasoned that the Edmunds Act was intended, like prior acts, to 
protect the institution o f monogamous marriage and should be liberally 
construed to achieve that intent. To adopt a construction of the act that 
allowed a polygamist to choose freely between his legal and his plural 
wives was clearly offensive to the act’s spirit. Thus, the court presumed 
that a man cohabited with his lawful wife. At first this was offered as a 
rebuttable presumption, justified by society’s policy of encouraging 
marital fidelity and by common experience as a factual generalization. 
The Snow court still appeared to require at least some evidence of actual 
cohabitation. Clever polygamists were able to get around the presump­
tion by demonstrating that in their case it was incorrect. Thus, courts very 
quickly deemphasized the factual rationale for the presumption and 
instead emphasized its legal and social policy rationale. As they did, the 
strength of the presumption increased, and the extent to which it could be 
refuted by contrary evidence diminished.66
Finally, in 1888 the Utah Supreme Court so diluted the amount of 
evidence required to render the presumption of cohabitation with a 
legal wife conclusive that, in effect, the presumption became a conclu­
sive presumption of law. In United States vs. Harris, the court approved
The Evidence of Cohabitation
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jury instructions to the effect that if “the legal wife of the defendant lives 
in the same vicinity with him, bearing his name, in a household main­
tained in part by him; that i s . . .  absolutely and conclusively cohabitation 
with his legal w ife.”67 Under such a standard, it seemed unlikely that any 
polygamist could insulate himself from all contact with his lawful wife 
sufficiently to avoid a finding of cohabitation. Certainly, the presump­
tion of cohabitation created a strong disincentive for polygamists to 
attempt to support and care for the women they had married. Conversely, 
Harris provided some measure of relief to polygamists. If cohabitation 
with one’s lawful wife was strongly presumed, “when you come to 
cohabitation with the illegal wife, then the presumptions are all against 
i t”68
The presumption of cohabitation effectively shifted the burden of 
proof in criminal trials. In essence, a polygamist was presumed guilty of 
cohabitation unless he could prove his innocence.
The eaise of the prosecutor’s task in proving cohabitation was 
further enhanced by judicial rulings on the type of evidence that could be 
admitted to establish cohabitation. In United States vs. Snow, the court, 
noting the strong legislative policy of stamping out all vestiges and 
appearances of polygamy, concluded that to achieve Congress’s goal 
loose evidentiary standards were required:
In these polygamic relations there never is . and cannot be that 
intimate association, and habitual attention given by the man to the 
various women, as exist between a husband and his wife in the monogamic 
state. Consequently, in the very nature of things, the proof o f cohabitation 
cannot be made as clear as in the case o f a monogamic marriage, 
simply because the facts o f which proof is to*be made do not as abundantly 
exist.69
Circumstantial evidence, such as “language, and conduct, and appear­
ances, and expressions,” could serve as evidence of cohabitation.70 The 
fact that a man was seen watering his horses at a plural w ife’s well or 
taking her provisions suggested an unlawful cohabitation.71 A birthday 
party given for an aging polygamist and attended by his plural families 
similarly indicated cohabitation.72 The net of circumstantial evidence 
was spread even wider to include evidence of reputation.73 A few  
cautionary voices, however, were raised. The Arizona Supreme Court 
warned that evidence of reputation “standing alone, would amount to 
nothing in such a case,” but in conjunction with “all the other proof and 
circumstances,” reputation could be considered by a jury.74 The Idaho 
Supreme Court went further and excluded evidence of reputation 
altogether: “To assume the guilt without proof of the acts would be 
manifestly improper.”75
Similarly, evidence that the defendant had fled to avoid arrest was 
deemed admissible as circumstantial evidence of guilt.76 For example, in
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Snow it was held that “the jury, in ascertaining whether the appellant was 
guilty or not, had the right to take into consideration his concealment at 
the time of arrest, and also the manner of concealment.”77
If a defendant’s guilt could be established by a presumption that he 
cohabited with his wives, lawful and polygamous, prosecutors first had 
to prove that the defendant had married those women. The same reasons 
that made the Morrill Act nearly useless also made it difficult to prove a 
marriage sufficiently to raise a presumption of cohabitation. Conse­
quently, courts lowered evidentiary standards, allowing marriages to be 
proved by circumstantial evidence: “Proof that two parties have treated 
each other as husband and wife, have lived together as such, and have 
held each other out to the world as such, is sufficient to enable a court or 
jury to find that at some previous time the parties did, as a fact, consent 
to be married.”78 In effect, then, the offenses of polygamy and cohabita­
tion became identical in terms o f the proof required for each; each could 
be proven by evidence that a couple associated so as to appear to be 
married. Statements by a defendant that a woman was his wife, made out 
of court and before any charges had been made against him, could be 
introduced at trial to prove his marriage79 or to prove cohabitation.80 For 
example, in United States vs. Smith the defendant was convicted on 
testimony that he had “said ‘w e’ or ‘they’ (not positive which) ‘would 
never give [polygamy] up; that the law against it was unconstitutional; 
and that he had just as good a right to decide on it as the supreme 
court.’ ”8L Thus, a rash criticism of Supreme Court decisions was trans­
formed into an admission of guilt of cohabitation.
Finally, cohabitation trials raised the issue of what time periods of 
cohabitation could be shown to establish the offense. Conduct of a 
defendant before enactment of the Edmunds Act in 1882 did not 
constitute an offense and therefore should have been irrelevant in 
cohabitation cases. But courts admitted evidence of such conduct on two 
theories. The first rested on certain presumptions: If a lawful relationship 
was formed, then subsequently made unlawful, the law would presume 
that the parties had terminated the relationship unless the contrary was 
proved.82 But polygamy had been unlawful, the court pointed out, since 
the Morrill Act in 1862 and for more than a generation under common 
law in the Territory. If an individual entered into an unlawful relationship 
at any point in time, the law would presume that the relationship 
continued, in the absence of evidence that it had ceased.83
The other rationale for allowing evidence of a defendant’s prior 
conduct was less ambitious. Just as in a murder case, evidence of how the 
defendant behaved toward and felt about the victim before the murder 
might be admitted, evidence of how the defendant regarded his plural 
wives before 1882 could be admitted to show how he regarded them at 
the time of the offense.84 Evidence of prior conduct was admissible, not
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to show liability but “merely to illustrate and explain the evidence as to 
what took place during the time laid in the indictment.”85 A defendant’s 
cohabitation prior to passage of the Edmunds Act was evidence of his 
propensity to violate the law and of his evil intentions. As such, the 
evidence could be thrown in, along with all the other circumstantial 
evidence, for the jury’s consideration.86 However, while evidence of 
prior conduct, as in a murder trial, may be admitted to establish the 
defendant’s motive or knowledge, the evidence of prior conduct 
admitted in the polygamy trials was not evidence of cohabitation, 
precisely the offense charged. Such evidence could only have prejudiced 
or confused a jury, making it likely that a defendant would be improperly 
convicted on the basis of his prior conduct or that the jury would 
improperly conclude that because the defendant had previously 
cohabited he must have been guilty of cohabitation as charged.
In loosening the rules of evidence to serve Congress’s policy 
of ensuring the punishment of polygamy, the courts undermined the 
elemental bases of judicial procedure and due process of law. The most 
basic assumptions that an accused is presumed innocent and must be 
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by competent evidence were 
sapped of all strength. The courts were indeed accurate when they 
identified cohabitation as an offense of appearance or reputation, for 
under such evidentiary standards an accused’s actual conduct seemed 
largely irrelevant. Mormons widely reputed to be polygamists, through 
the use of strings of presumptions and the testimony of what people 
thought their marital relations to be, could be quickly convicted whatever 
they tried to do.
Witnesses to Cohabitation
To convict Mormon men of polygamy offenses, certainly no more 
effective and knowledgeable witnesses could be found than their wives. 
Two obstacles, however, appeared to bar use of this pool of witnesses. 
First, many— if not most— Mormon wives were unwilling to testify 
against their husbands. Second, even if they were willing to testify, at 
common law a person could not testify against his or her spouse. 
Polygamy prosecutions raised perplexing problems. For example, did 
this spousal disability apply to illegal-, polygamous wives? If so, what if 
it could not be determined which was the lawful and which were the 
plural wives? The issues were first confronted in United States vs. Miles, 
the only other Morrill Act case to reach the United States Supreme Court 
besides Reynolds.*1
From the evidence at trial, it appeared that John Miles had married 
three women on the same day. Because Miles was charged with bigamy, 
under the Morrill Act, it was necessary to prove his marriages to the three
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women, and therein lay the difficulty, for the marriage ceremony was 
shrouded in secrecy. M iles’s wife Caroline, however, was willing to 
testify against him.88 Miles conceded his marriage to Caroline but denied 
his marriage to his first wife. Caroline’s testimony was essential to the 
state’s case, but if Caroline was M iles’s lawful wife under the common 
law rule her testimony was inadmissible. But her testimony helped 
establish that at the time Miles married her he already had a lawful wife. 
And if Miles had a wife when he married Caroline, his marriage to her 
was invalid, and she was a competent witness.
The trial court resolved this perplexing question by throwing the 
whole matter to the jury. Caroline was allowed to testify. At the end of 
the trial, the jury was instructed that only if they found that Miles was 
already married when he married Caroline could they then consider 
Caroline’s testimony in determining whether Miles was guilty of 
bigamy. The instruction, of course, was useless because tautological. In 
determining whether Caroline’s testimony on the issue of M iles’s guilt 
was admissible, the jury necessarily had to determine the issue of his 
guilt.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court rejected the trial 
court’s ingenious labor-saving device. It concluded that a defendant’s 
witness-wife must be treated prima facie as his lawful wife: “as long as 
the fact of the first marriage is contested, the second wife cannot be 
admitted to prove it.”89 The principle behind this ruling was the old rule 
that a witness that is “prima facie incompetent” cannot give evidence 
“to establish his competency, and at the same time prove the issue.”90 The 
Court reached this ruling with apparent regret, for in doing so it 
recognized that it was disabling almost all witnesses to polygamous 
unions. However, the Court recommended two escapes from this 
predicament. First, eyewitnesses to a marriage were not necessary. 
Polygamous marriages could be proven like any other fact, by admis­
sions of the defendant or by circumstantial evidence.91 Second, if under 
existing laws it was too difficult to prove polygamy Congress could 
always change the law.92 Because it was based on the testimony of an 
incompetent witness, M iles’s conviction was reversed.
Miles did not end the issue of a w ife’s competency to testify against 
her husband. The general rule that a wife was not a competent witness 
against her husband was subject, under common law and the Utah statute, 
to several exceptions. A Utah statute, for example, provided that a wife 
could testify against her husband in a civil action by one spouse against 
the other or in a criminal action for a crime committed by one against the 
other.93 In United States vs. Bassett, the Utah Supreme Court concluded 
that polygamy was, in fact, an offense by the husband against his lawful 
wife, “more injurious” to her than bodily injury. Thus, the rule of spousal 
disability did not apply, and the wife was a competent witness.94
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Again, however, the United States Supreme Court rejected the 
territorial court’s analysis.95 First, the Court concluded that the Utah 
courts had applied the wrong statute. They had applied a statute found in 
Utah’s code of civil procedure, which adopted the common law rule of 
spousal disability but expressly provided that the rule did not apply to 
criminal actions for offenses committed by one spouse against the other. 
A second, older statute, contained in Utah’s criminal code, provided that 
a spouse might testify only in cases o f “criminal violence” upon one 
spouse by the other. The Court concluded that although the section of the 
civil code was more recently adopted and would thus otherwise take 
priority, in fact the criminal code provision should have been applied 
because Bassett was a criminal case and polygamy could not rationally 
be construed as an act of criminal violence. Less technically, the Court 
concluded that even under the statute employed by the Utah courts, 
polygamy could not be properly viewed as an offense against the wife:
Polygamy and adultery may be crimes which involve disloyalty to the 
marital relation, but they are rather crimes against such relation than against 
the wife; and, as the statute speaks o f crimes against her, it is simply an 
affirmation o f the old familiar and just common law rule.96
Nearly seven years after the United States Supreme Court decision 
in Miles excluded the testimony of polygamous wives in polygamy trials, 
Congress, in the Edmunds-Tucker Act, provided that a wife was a 
competent witness in polygamy, bigamy, and cohabitation trials and 
required that records be kept of weddings in the territories.97 These 
provisions still retained one restraint on spousal testimony, however; 
they provided only that a willing wife would be allowed to testify. The 
act specifically forbade attempts by the judiciary to compel wives to 
testify against their husbands. Utah’s judges did not always follow the 
law, however. A number of Mormon women were required to testify 
against their husbands or face contempt charges.98 The power of 
contempt could be a fearful weapon. On the basis of the most sketchy or 
nonexistent hearings, Mormon wives who refused to testify against 
their husbands could be sent to prison for indefinite periods.99 In 1888 
Representative Bumes read to the House of Representatives a report by 
a visitor to Utah’s prison: .
I found in one cell (meaning a cell o f the penitentiary in Utah).10 by 13 1/2 
feet, without a floor, six women, three o f whom had babies under six months 
o f age, who were incarcerated for contempt o f court in refusing to acknowl­
edge the paternity o f their children. When I plead with them to answer the 
court and be released, they said: “If we do, there are many w ives and 
children to suffer the loss o f a father/’100
Judicial use of the contempt power in the polygamy cases thus 
presented many Mormon families with a cruel dilemma. If the wife called
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as a witness submitted and testified, her husband would almost surely be 
convicted and imprisoned. If she refused, her husband might escape 
conviction, but the wife would be imprisoned. At least one Mormon 
husband, Rudger Clawson, directed his wife to testify at his trial after she 
had spent a night in the penitentiary for refusing to do so .101
In retrospect it is difficult to offer any explanation for this judicial 
conduct toward Mormon wives other than a spirit of vindictiveness. The 
polygamy laws, which were being vigorously enforced in the latter part 
of the 1880s, imposed ample punishment for the women who stubbornly 
clung to polygamy. The imposition of contempt sentences on wives who 
refused to testify introduced a sort of random sexual equality in the 
federal punishment of polygamy that was being imposed on Utah's 
Mormons. Courts had reduced the quantum of evidence required to 
establish polygamy or cohabitation to such a low level that in almost any 
case ample alternate sources of proof must have been available. So 
Utah’s courts could not have believed that they needed to compel 
Mormon women to testify in order to convict their polygamous 
husbands. The cohabitation cases produced heartrending stories of 
suffering and pathos. Men were forbidden to associate with their children 
or provide for their former wives. Women were denied care and associa­
tion with former husbands. Moreover, the law, not limited to prohibiting 
future polygamous marriages, fell with all its severity upon people whose 
relationships had most often been established when the law did not 
unambiguously forbid them.
THE VITALITY OF REYNOLDS TODAY
The legislative and judicial war on polygamy was ultimately 
successful. The Church officially abandoned the practice in 1890. 
However, the war was not without its casualties. The Court’s decision in 
Reynolds was a good example of “a situation where the social import of 
the issue outstrips the political and legal resources of the time.” 102 The 
Court’s overly restrictive view of the free exercise clause virtually read 
it out of the Constitution for over sixty years.
Reynolds continues to be cited as binding precedent today.103 But 
beginning in 1940, in Cantwell vs. Connecticut, the Court began to 
qualify the belief-action distinction that Reynolds had established and to 
redefine the scope of the free exercise clause.104 The Cantwell family, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, had been going door-to-door playing an anti­
Catholic recording. They were convicted of soliciting religious 
contributions without a state certificate and of breaking the peace. 
While maintaining the belief-action distinction, the Cantwell Court 
rejected the implication of Reynolds that religious conduct was 
completely outside the protection of the First Amendment. The Court
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stated that free exercise “embraces two concepts— freedom to believe 
and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the 
second cannot be.”105 Yet the Court recognized that the power to regulate 
religious conduct could not be so exercised as to infringe unduly upon the 
freedom of religious conscience. Cantwell required that statutes 
regulating religious conduct be “narrowly drawn” so as to punish only 
specific conduct that was a clear and present danger to the state.106 The 
Court reversed the convictions.
In Sherbert vs. Verner, the Supreme Court followed Cantwell's 
lead and further solidified the protection of conduct under the free 
exercise clause.107 Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist, was discharged 
by her employer and was unable to obtain other employment because she 
would not work on Saturday. Her claim for state unemployment 
compensation was denied. The Court reversed, extending free exercise 
protection to a government’s withholding of an economic benefit as 
opposed to the government’s imposition of a direct burden on religious 
conscience.
Finally, in Wisconsin vs. Yoder, the Supreme Court abandoned the 
belief-action distinction for a test that balanced the competing interests 
surrounding the free exercise clause.108 In Yoder, Amish parents objected 
to the compulsory high school education of their children on the grounds 
that exposure to modem values and advanced education would destroy 
the insular society and simple life-style that were essential to the Amish 
religion.
In upholding the right of Amish children not to attend high school, 
the Court expressly rejected Reynolds's proposition that the First 
Amendment was concerned solely with matters of belief. Suggesting that 
matters of religious belief and conduct could not be meaningfully 
separated into watertight categories, the Court recognized that its subse­
quent decisions had “rejected the idea that religiously grounded conduct 
is always outside the protection of the Free Exercise Clause.”109 To be 
sure, only conduct that is genuinely religious practice qualifies for First 
Amendment protection, but genuinely religious conduct must be 
afforded great deference by the state. For a law restricting religious 
conduct to stand, there must be an interest of “sufficient magnitude to 
override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise 
Clause.”110 To determine whether a particular exercise is protected by 
the First Amendment, the Court balances the competing interests. 
Applying this test, the Court conceded that the state interest in universal 
education was compelling but concluded that compulsory education 
beyond the eighth grade was an infringement of the free exercise of the 
parents’ religious beliefs.
Of course, it is a matter of speculation whether Reynolds would 
have been convicted had the Court used a Yoder-type balancing test. But
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had the government been required to show a compelling interest, it would 
have had to produce evidence of the social injury caused by 
polygamy. The evidence available today suggests that “Mormon 
polygamy neither caused or could cause the degradation of women and 
children or the subversion of democracy.” 111 Even in the hard cases where 
the First Amendment has been invoked on behalf of unpopular religions 
and practices, such as People vs. Woody, modem courts have generally 
accorded substantial deference to religious values.112 In Woody, a group 
of Navajos asserted that the First Amendment protected their use of 
the hallucinogen peyote as a part of their religious services. After a 
careful assessment of the use of peyote in the defendants’ religious life, 
the California Supreme Court concluded that the state’s interest in 
controlling drug use did not outweigh the claims of religious freedom. 
The so-called compelling state interest in protecting the Navajo from the 
deleterious effects of the drug was dismissed with the comment, “We 
know of no doctrine that the state, in its asserted omniscience, should 
undertake to deny to defendants the observance of their religion in order 
to free them from the suppositious ‘shackles’ of their ‘unenlightened’ 
and ‘primitive condition.’ ” 113
The fair-minded and tolerant attitude toward strange and unpopular 
religions expressed by the court in Woody is perhaps as important a 
change from Reynolds as is the new judicial doctrine expressed in Yoder. 
The Reynolds Court directed much polemic against polygamy but made 
no attempt to assess the religious significance of polygamy to Mormon 
doctrine and society or to weigh that practice against the state’s interests. 
The state interests invoked to justify its elimination appear untenable in 
light of the analysis in Yoder and Woody. The diffuse social interest in 
preventing patriarchal family structures to preserve democracy, based on 
sociological theories, is precisely the sort of general state interest that 
was rejected in Yoder. And the paternalistic state interest in freeing 
Mormon women from their supposed domination is precisely the sort of 
state interest that was rejected in Woody. Thus, the developments of the 
twentieth century have undermined the Reynolds rationale.
Nevertheless, the modem Court has at times shown signs of 
backtracking from the Sherbert-Yoder line of cases. The vitality of Yoder 
was questioned just ten years after Yoder, in United States vs. L e e n 
Lee— like Yoder, an Amish— employed several other Amish. He 
objected on religious grounds to paying the social security tax 
imposed on employers. The Court purported to apply the Yoder 
balancing test but reached a different result from that in Yoder. In 
rejecting Lee’s claim to an exemption from the law, the Court tried to 
distinguish Yoder on the grounds that a tax system could not function if 
exemptions were too easily granted on the basis of religious belief, 
whereas an educational system could presumably tolerate religious
1ampaign against Polygamy 111
exemptions.115 Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, found Yoder 
indistinguishable. The same religious interest was implicated in each 
case, and the state interest in Yoder was no less compelling than 
the federal interest in Lee. Justice Stevens argued that the Court’s 
decisions rested on a different constitutional standard, namely, that a 
person who objects to a valid, neutral law of general applicability on 
religious grounds should have “an almost insurmountable burden” of 
demonstrating “that there is a unique reason for allowing him a special 
exemption.” He found Yoder the “principal exception” to this rule. The 
majority’s conclusion in Lee, he argued, suggested that the Court in fact 
placed a heavier burden on the party challenging the law than Yoder 
would warrant.116
Free exercise decisions since Lee give credence to Justice 
Stevens’s interpretation of Supreme Court precedents and suggest that 
the Court is dissatisfied with Sherbert-Y oder balancing test or at least 
to the relative weights of the individual and governmental interests 
involved. Sherbert and Yoder would suggest that “the thumb [should be] 
on the religious freedom side of the balance.” 117 But while professing to 
apply the Sherbert-Yoder test, the modem Court has at times shown 
unusual deference to the government’s purported interests. As a result, 
the Court has reached some questionable results and has demonstrated an 
inconsistency in its free exercise jurisprudence that threatens to under­
mine the civil libertarian approach of the Sherbert-Y oder line of cases.
In Jensen vs. Quaring, the Court considered a free exercise 
challenge to Nebraska’s requirement that drivers’ licenses include a 
photograph of the licensee.118 Mrs. Quaring objected to the requirement 
as it was applied to her on the grounds that her religious beliefs prohibited 
the use of her photograph. The state failed to provide any evidence that 
its interests would be harmed if it provided an exemption for those 
opposed to photographs on religious grounds, as Yoder would seem to 
require. In fact, the state provided some nonreligious exemptions.119 Yet 
the Court barely upheld Mrs. Quaring’s free exercise challenge, 
affirming by a four-to-four vote the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion that 
Nebraska had to provide her a photoless driver’s license.
The Court was faced with a similar question in Bowen vs. Roy.120 
The parents of a Native American brought an action challenging on First 
Amendment grounds the requirement that recipients of certain welfare 
benefits provide a social security number. The parents claimed that use 
of a social security number for their daughter would violate their 
religious beliefs. They sought and obtained in the lower court an 
injunction preventing the government from (1) making any use of their 
daughter’s social security number, and (2) denying their daughter 
welfare benefits because of the parents’ refusal to “furnish” her social 
security number to the state agency administering the welfare plan.121
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When the case reached the Supreme Court, it generated five 
separate opinions. The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, 
easily rejected the first provision of the injunction. The Court stated that 
the free exercise clause was meant to protect individuals from certain 
forms of governmental compulsion: “it does not afford an individual a 
right to dictate the conduct of the Government’s internal procedures.” 
Eight justices agreed that once the government had the number it could 
use it as it wished in conducting “its own internal affairs.”122 Because the 
government already had the daughter’s social security number and could 
use it however it saw fit, Justices Blackmun and Stevens saw no reason 
to reach the constitutional questions presented by the second part of the 
injunction. Six of the remaining justices, however, reached the issue of 
whether the government could withhold welfare benefits to someone 
who refused to furnish a social security number for religious reasons, 
with very different results.123 The Chief Justice (joined by Justices 
Rehnquist and Powell) drew a distinction between “governmental 
compulsion and conditions relating to governmental benefits.”124 The 
Chief Justice expressly rejected a Yoder-type balancing test where the 
challenged governmental action did not “inescapably compel conduct 
that some find objectionable for religious reasons.”125 In the absence of 
proof of a discriminatory intent, he would uphold a neutral and uniform 
requirement for governmental benefits if it was merely “a reasonable 
means o f promoting a legitimate public interest.” 126 Under that standard, 
the Chief Justice would have upheld the entire statutory scheme in Roy. 
On the other hand, Justice O ’Connor (dissenting in part and joined by 
Justices Brennan and Marshall) found that the Chief Justice’s proposed 
test had “no basis in precedent and relegates a serious First Amendment 
value to the barest level of minimal scrutiny that the Equal Protection 
Clause already provides.” Justice O ’Connor would have applied “our 
long line of precedents to hold that the Government must [accommodate] 
a legitimate free exercise claim unless pursuing an especially important 
interest by narrowly tailored means.” 127 Under this Yoder type of 
analysis, she would have upheld the second part of the injunction.128
Despite indications in Lee and Roy that at least some members 
of the Court were ready to abandon the Sherbert-Yoder balancing test, 
in Hobbie vs. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n} the first free 
exercise case to reach the Rehnquist Court, the Court strongly reaffirmed 
Sherbert (only Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented).129 Ms. Hobbie, like 
Ms. Sherbert, was a Seventh-Day Adventist who was denied unemploy­
ment compensation when she lost her job for refusing to work on 
Saturdays. The state tried to distinguish Sherbert on the grounds that 
Hobbie had recently converted to her religion and expected her employer 
to accommodate this change, whereas Sherbert had not— a distinction, 
Justice Scalia suggested, that one would only make “if one did not like
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Sherbert to begin with.”130 The Court rejected the distinction, pointing 
out that it would “single out the religious convert for different, less 
favorable treatment than that given an individual whose adherence to his 
or her faith precedes employment.” 131 The state also argued for the less 
rigorous free exercise test that Chief Justice Burger had suggested in Roy, 
but the Court firmly rejected the argument. The Court reaffirmed that, 
when the state denies an important benefit because of conduct mandated 
by religious belief, the denial “must be subjected to strict scrutiny and 
[can] be justified only by proof by the State of a compelling interest.”132 
The belief-conduct distinction of Reynolds has been jettisoned by 
later cases. Substantial protection of religious practice as well as belief 
is now accepted under the free exercise clause. Because belief has long 
been protected under the speech clause, this development is logical, 
historically correct, and beneficial to society. To avoid redundancy, the 
free exercise clause must be interpreted as protecting religious conduct 
as well as belief. Nevertheless, it would be unrealistic to expect a 
Supreme Court as socially conservative as this, or for that matter any 
Court likely to exist in the near future, formally to overturn Reynolds and 
sanction the practice of polygamy.133 (Nor, for that matter, would it be 
likely that the Mormon church would ever again enter into that practice 
even if the law permitted it.) What should be expected, however, is that 
the emergence of the free exercise clause as a vibrant base for civil 
libertarian protection of rights of conscience under Sherbert and Yoder 
will be strengthened and expanded. Any tendency toward erosion of the 
free-exercise protection should be stoutly resisted.
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